We study provably secure anonymity. We begin with rigorous definition of anonymity against wide range of computationally bounded attackers, including eavesdroppers, malicious peers, malicious destinations, and their combinations. Following [21] , our definition is generic, and captures different notions of anonymity (e.g., unobservability and sender anonymity).
INTRODUCTION
Anonymous communication is an important goal, and is also interesting and challenging. Since the publication of the first, seminal paper by Chaum [9] , there has been a large research effort by cryptography and security researchers to study anonymity and develop solutions, resulting in numerous publications and several systems.
Research of anonymous communication is challenging; indeed, it is not even easy to agree on good definitions. Much of the research uses entropy-based definitions, e.g., the probability of identifying the sender must be lower than some Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. threshold. Syverson discusses in depth the limitations of this definitional approach [31] , and in particular, the fact that it fails to capture the capabilities and limitations of the attacker.
Our goal is to study rigorous definitions, capturing the strongest possible and feasible definitions of anonymous communication. Following the approach of [31] , we focus on well-defined adversary capabilities, and present a rigorous, indistinguishability-based definition, considering also the strongest possible adversaries and the strongest anonymity requirements.
It seems that rigorous study of anonymous communication, may necessarily involve complex definitions; this probably explains the fact that with so much research on anonymous communication, not many works use rigorous models. Our work extends the definitions of Hevia and Micciancio [21] , which are based on an indistiguishability experiment: the attacker chooses two scenarios and the experiment simulates one of them; the attacker should distinguish which scenario was simulated.
In [21] , the adversary was limited, and in particular was only 'eavesdropper' -it could not control any participant, in particular, not the destination. These limitations are very significant; in fact, most of the efforts to develop and research anonymous communication, in particular deployed anonymity systems, focused on anonymity against a (malicious) destination and/or malicious peers. We extend [21] to deal with such realistic threats.
Our extended definitions allow adversary to control active, malicious peers and destination. This requires us to define precise model and experiments. These are (even) more complex that these of [21] ; however, this complexity may be unavoidable when trying to rigorously study anonymity. (One obvious challenge for future research is to present simple models and definitions.)
Dealing with a malicious destination is esp. challenging. Indeed, many of the anonymity properties considered in the common terminology of Pfitzmann and Hansen [24] [25] [26] , e.g., unobservability, are trivially inapplicable against a malicious destination (which can observe received traffic). We conclude, that 'ultimate' anonymity requires the strongest properties achievable against malicious destination, and in addition, the strongest properties achievable assuming a benign destination.
Another challenge we had to deal with, is that a strong adversary should be allowed to be adaptive. As with many cryptographic primitives, there is a significant difference between adaptive and non-adaptive adversaries (for example CCA1 and CCA2 encryption schemes [2] ), and between passive and active attackers (for example security against semi honest or malicious adversaries in multi party computation protocols [17] ). To deal with adaptive and active attackers, we defined a simulation model for the tested protocols. This challenge was not relevant or addressed in previous works, e.g., [21] .
Using our definitions and model, it is possible to formally prove different anonymity notions with respect to different attacker capabilities. The attacker capabilities include the corrupted participants, and the participants to whom it can eavesdrop. Protocols can have different anonymity notions against different attackers with different capabilities. An example to formal proof of anonymity notions against these attackers using our definitions, appears in [14] .
Contributions
Our main contribution is in presenting rigorous, indistinguishability based definitions for anonymous communication protocols, whose anonymity is assured even against strong, malicious, adaptive attackers, which may control nodes, possibly including the destination. Previous rigorous definitions [21] were limited to eavesdropping attackers, not even ensuring anonymity against the destination; therefore, this is significant, critical extension.
We explore two variants of this definition. The stronger requirements essentially formalizes the strongest anonymity considered in the literature, e.g., in the common terminology [24] [25] [26] . We show it is possible to achieve this variant, albeit, with an inefficient protocol (more a 'proof of feasibility' than a real protocol). We further show, that this inefficiency is unavoidable, i.e., we prove that any protocol meeting this variant of the definition, would be very inefficient. This motivates slightly relaxing the anonymity requirements, as we do in our second definition. Indeed, we show that this slightly-relaxed definition can be satisfied, with reasonable efficient protocols. For example, the classical DC-net protocol [10] that fails to satisfy the stronger requirement, does satisfy this slightly weaker requirement. In [15] , we also present improved protocol, which ensures this anonymity property even against multiple malicious nodes.
Organization
In Section 2, we formally define the adversary model, and present our indistinguishability based definition. In Section 3, we extend the definition to consider also malicious destination. In Section 4, we discuss the feasibility of the definition from Section 3 against strong attackers. In Section 5 we present slightly relaxed definition for some of the anonymity notions against malicious destination, and in Section 6 we conclude and discuss future directions.
Related Work
There is a huge body of research in theory and practice of anonymous communication, beginning with Chaum's paper [9] ; see, e.g., a survey of known protocols in [28] . We focus on recent definitional works.
Hevia and Micciancio [21] presented rigorous, indistinguishability based definitions to most anonymity notions, limited eavesdropper adversaries. Our work extends [21] to deal with strong, active, malicious attackers, including destination. Their work contains also detailed discussion of related work until 2008.
Several works use logic based approach, which simplifies the cryptographic properties [19, 20, 22, 32, 34] .
Few recent works extend [21] in different ways, e.g., applying the UC framework [7] for anonymous communication [33] , and further studying relations among the notions [5, 23] . However, these works do not address our goals of studying the strongest anonymity notions, in particular, against strong active adversaries.
Pfitzmann and Hansen offered terminology to anonymity properties [25] , that contains comparison between the terminology to the anonymity notions in [21] .
Other works offer formal analysis of specific protocols. In [6] , [1] and [13] the Onion-Routing (OR) [27] protocol is discussed; the authors present definitions for OR in the UC framework [7] . In [13] , the model of Feigenbaum et al. [12] is used. In [6] and [1] the authors further discuss the security properties required for OR cryptographic primitives, to achieve provable anonymity.
DEFINITIONS
Following Hevia and Micciancio [21] , our definition is based on an experiment that simulates protocol runs. We let the adversary choose two scenarios {(0), (1)}. The adversary controls the scenarios, by controlling the application level of all the protocol participants: who sends what to whom in both scenarios. This is done by periodically choosing two matrices of messages, M (0) and M (1) , one for each scenario {(0), (1)}.
The "relation" between the scenarios is restricted by the anonymity notion N that is tested in the experiment and by the capabilities of the adversary.
We define two experiments; the first simulates the protocols by the M (0) matrices, and the second by M (1) matrices. The information that the adversary receives during the simulation, is restricted by its capability (for example: global eavesdropper receives all the traffic). The goal of the adversary is to distinguish between the two experiments.
Network Model, Adversary and Peers
Network model.
Since our goal is to study anonymity against adaptive and active attackers, we need a rigorous communication and execution model.
In this work, we adopt the simplest model: fully synchronous ('rounds/iterations') communication with instantaneous computation, allowing direct communication between every two participants (clique).
Peers.
We let the adversary control the 'application layer' of all peers, i.e., deliver requests to the protocol layer, to send messages to particular destination(s).
In the protocol layer, the honest peers follow the protocol and are simulated by the experiment, while the attacker controls the 'malicious peers'.
Different peers can have different roles in the protocol; for example, protocols that use mixes [9, 29] or routers [11] to assist anonymous communication by other peers, often have two types of peers: client and mix (or router). The roles of the participants are determined by the protocol.
Adversary.
The experiment simulates one of two scenarios that the adversary chooses and manages adaptively. The adversary controls the application layer of all the peers in each of the scenarios, by choosing at every round, two matrices M (0) , M (1) of messages (from each peer, and to each peer). The capabilities of the adversary (e.g., the number of corrupted machines) and the tested anonymity notion, restrict the relation between the scenarios the adversary can choose. Regardless of these restrictions, peers controlled by the attacker, can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol during the experiment (i.e., act in malicious/byzantine manner).
The ability to select the entire sequence of messages to be sent (the matrices) follows the 'conservative' approach applied in experiments of cryptographic primitives such as encryption [3] [2] . As mentioned in [21] , in reality, the attacker might have some influence on the application level of its victims. Because we cannot predict the attacker's influence about the application in different real scenarios, we conservatively give the attacker the whole control.
Notations and Anonymity Notions
For every type of adversary, and every anonymity notion N (e.g., anonymity, unlinkability, unobservability) there is a relation that restricts the scenarios that the adversary can choose in the experiment.
Informally, if every efficient adversary of some type (e.g., eavesdropper, or malicious destination), cannot distinguish between every two scenarios, that are restricted by a relation of some anonymity notion N, than the protocol ensures the anonymity notion N corresponds to the relation, against this kind of adversaries.
In this paper there are four different types of relations: 
Notations.
We use the following common cryptographic and mathematical notations:
For n ∈ N, we use [n] to denote the set {1, 2, ..., n}. We use P(S) to denote the power set of a set S. Consider a set S, and a multiset S, then S ∈ S* if and only if for every s ∈ S, s ∈ S.
We use V = {0, 1} l to denote the messages space. A collection of messages between n parties is represented by a n × n matrix, M = (mi,j) i,j∈ [n] . Each element mi,j ⊂ V * is the multiset of messages from the i-th party to the j-th party 1 . In this paper, a PPT algorithm is polynomial time with regarding to its first parameter. 1 We replaced [21] 's notation P(V ) with V *, because a powerset does not contain multisets.
Eavesdropper adversaries anonymity notions:
The R N relation
To break anonymity notion N (see Table 1 ), the attacker should distinguish between two scenarios it chooses (as sequences of matrices). To prevent eavesdropper attackers from distinguishing between the scenarios according to information that the anonymity notion does not aim to hide (unprotected data), [21] define for the different anonymity notions, relations on the scenario matrices. Every relation enforces both the matrices to contain the same unprotected data.
The relations R N on pairs of scenario matrices for the different anonymity notions, are defined and detailed in Appendix A and in Table 1 .
Note that in most of this paper, we focus on the strongest relations could be achieved against the different attackers: unobservability (UO) and sender anonymity (SA). The unobservability relation R UO simply holds for all matrices pairs, i.e., does not restrict the matrices at all. The relation for the sender anonymity notion, R SA , requires that for every (recipient) i, in both the matrices the i-th column contains the same messages. Namely, every participant receives the same messages (the attacker cannot learn information by what the recipients receive). That way, the attacker can distinguish between the scenarios only by the senders.
Anonymity with corrupted nodes: The
The R N relations (Section 2.2.1 and Appendix A) are applicable only for eavesdropper adversaries. If the attacker controls a peer in the protocol, then it can inspect the messages in the peer's application queue and check whether they are from M (0) or from M (1) . It can do the same also with the messages that the controlled peer receives. Consequently, the R N relations cannot be used for active adversaries.
We address this by defining new relations family, named R H N , such that H ⊆ [n] is the subset of honest participants. The R H N relation requires that in addition to the R N relation on the matrices pair, no messages will be sent (in the application level) from and to malicious participants ([n] − H). R H N extends the requirement of identical unprotected data in both the matrices, to active attackers. Figure 1 
, and a relation
Notice that messages are sent from honest peers to corrupted, only in the case of malicious destination; see Section 3.
The attacker capabilities
The attacker capabilities, denoted Cap, are a pair
specifies the machines controlled by adversary A, and Cap[EV ] identifies machines to which the attacker can eavesdrop (e.g., all machines, for a global eavesdropper). An attacker with capability Cap, controls the machines with indexes in Cap[H]
) ∈ R N and B0 and B1 contain only empty messages multisets. Notice that for all R N in Table 1 , (A0, A1) ∈ R N (for |H| × |H| matrices).
and eavesdrops the traffic of the machines with indexes in
In Section 3, we extend the attacker capabilities to deal also with malicious destination, by adding to Cap another element, a bit Cap[M D]; the definition of this section is the same as that definition, using Cap[MD] = 0. The parameter k is called security parameter. π is a PPT algorithm that represents the tested protocol, and n is the number of participants in the protocol simulation, n < l(k) when l(·) is some polynomial. To initialize the parties, e.g., establish shared (or public/private) keys, we use π.setup method, which receives the number of participants n and the identity i of a specific participant as parameters, and outputs the initial state of i (denoted by Si); this follows the 'common reference string' model [8] . In practice, this simply means that we assume the parties have appropriate keys (shared or public/private). The π.simulate method receives the current state of a participant, together with its incoming traffic and new messages from the application layer, and returns its next state and its outgoing traffic.
The Experiment Expt
The last two experiment's parameters, A and Cap, define the attacker. A is the attacker PPT algorithm, and Cap is its capabilities.
Overview
The experiment (see Algorithm 1) simulates the protocol, π, over one of two scenarios that the attacker, A, chooses and manages adaptively. The simulated scenario is chosen by the b bit. At the beginning of the experiment, π's setup produces a sequence of initial states for all the simulation participants (line 1), and H is defined to be the honest participants set (line 2). A is then initialized with the states of the participants it controls, and decides the maximal number of iterations that the experiment will run (rounds ∈ poly(k), 
N . See line 6). If the matrices are valid, the experiment passes only the messages in the M (b) matrix to the application queues of the participants and simulates the honest participants by π (line 10). A simulates the participants it controls (unnecessarily by the protocol. See line 12).
At the end of every iteration, the adversary A can choose b = N U LL to end the experiment and guess b for the simulated scenario b, or b = N U LL to continue (lines 13 and 14) . The experiment might end, returning 0, if the attacker chooses invalid pair of matrices ( ∈ R H N ), or after rounds iterations.
Experiment additional notations
Si is the state of the i-th participant. The experiment saves and manages the states of the honest participants.
SA is the state of the attacker A. The experiment gets and saves the attacker state after every action of A, and sends it as a parameter for every action A should do. The initial information for A is the initial states of the peers it controls.
We use Ci,j,t to denote the set of the elements (possibly ciphertexts), that were sent from the i-th participant to the j-th participant (the participants that are represented by Si and Sj) during the t-th iteration.
Algorithm 1 Expt
for all i ∈ H do 10:
end for 12:
if b = N U LL return b end if 15: end for 16: return 0
Experiment runtime is O(poly(k))
The runtime of the experiment (Alg. 1) is polynomial; this is critical for the proof of the anonymity notions. Using our definition, it is possible to formally prove anonymity notions by a polynomial time reduction to cryptographic primitives.
The reduction contains simulation of the above experiment, and therefore its runtime must be polynomial in the security parameter k.
The main loop in the experiment (lines 4-15) does at most rounds iterations, where rounds is the length of a parameter that A outputs in poly(k) time (during the Initialize method with 1 k as the first argument), such that the number of iterations in the main loop is poly(k). The other loops do at most n iterations.
All the actions during the simulation take also polynomial time: The algorithms π and A are polytime (in the length of the first parameter 1 k ), and all the other actions in the experiment take constant time. The attacker's total runtime is also polynomial in k, as the attacker's total runtime is bounded by the experiment's total runtime.
Comp-N-Anonymity Definition
Definition 2. The Comp-N-advantage of an attacker A that runs with k as a parameter, is defined as:
Adv Table 1 ), against attackers with capability Cap ∈ P ([n])
2 , if for all PPT algorithms, A, there exists a negligible function negl such that,
ANONYMITY AGAINST MALICIOUS DESTINATION
The Comp-N-anonymity definition of the previous section covers the following attackers: eavesdroppers, malicious peers, and any combination of them that controls the application adaptively. However, due to the restrictions of the R H N relation, the definition cannot be used for testing anonymity properties when the attacker controls destinations of messages from honest peers. Such an attacker model is relevant for anonymous mail services and anonymous web surfing. Namely, this is one of the main goals of peer to peer networks like Tor [11] .
In this section we extend Definition 3 to deal also with malicious destination. This extension is relevant only for two Comp-N-anonymity notions: N ∈ {SU L, SA} (see Table 1 in Appendix A). The other anonymity notions are aimed to hide information that the destination has, and therefore they are irrelevant in such an attacker model.
To extend the definition also against malicious destination, we apply the R N relation also on the messages from honest peers to malicious peers. We enforce this new restriction by defining a new relation, R H N . Figure 2 depicts the new relation. 
Comp-N-Anonymity Against Malicious Destination
We extend the definition to deal with malicious destination, by extending the capability and the Comp-N-b experiment (Alg. 1).
Extending the attacker's capability
We add a bit M D to the attacker's capability. This bit indicates whether the attacker is treated as malicious destination or not. After the addition,
The default value of Cap[M D] is 0, so when testing protocol's anonymity notion not against malicious destination, the capability could be written as before the extension. 
ULTIMATE ANONYMITY
Definition 5. A protocol ensures ultimate anonymity if it ensures both the strongest anonymity notions feasible:
1. Comp-SA-anonymity (sender anonymity) against malicious destination that is a global eavesdropper and controls (a minority of the) additional participants (in short: strong malicious destination).
2. Comp-UO-anonymity (unobservability) against global eavesdropper and (a minority of the) participants (strong attacking peers).
In order to exclude the trivial solution of a protocol that does not send any message, we limit the discussion to protocols that ensure the liveness property; informally, protocols that while the attacker does not deviate from the protocol, ensure messages delivery.
A stronger property we would like to achieve is t-liveness. Informally, a protocol satisfies t-liveness if it ensures messages delivery in the presence of up to t malicious participants.
While ensuring unobservability against strong attacking peers is almost trivial, it is complicated to ensure sender anonymity against strong malicious destination and both the requirements together (ultimate anonymity).
Ensuring Comp-UO-Anonymity Against Strong Attacking peers
It is possible to ensure any anonymity notion N, against any combination of malicious participants and eavesdroppers (without malicious destination).
In fact, the following trivial protocol ensures Comp-UOanonymity against strong attacking peers (and therefore ensures all the other anonymity notions; see [15] ). In this protocol, every round, every participant sends a message (real or dummy) to every other participant; the communication is semantically secure encrypted [3] .
Because in this trivial protocol, honest peers communicate with each other directly, no information can be learned about the scenarios without learning information from the encrypted content. Formal proof would reduce the Comp-UO-anonymity to the security of the trivial protocol's encryption scheme.
Protocols that ensure Comp-UO-anonymity and yet provide some anonymity (although not Comp-SA-anonymity; see below) are DC-net [10] and mixnet [9] based protocols [29] that use fixed sending rate.
Known Protocols are Not Comp-SAAnonymous Against Strong Malicious Destination
None of the known protocols [28] is Comp-SA-anonymous against strong malicious destination.
For example, consider the DC-net protocol [10] . We show that DC-net is not Comp-SA-anonymous even against passive destination (in Appendix B.2). Briefly, DC-net fails to hide whether two messages are sent by the same peer or by different peers.
A similar attack works also against a scheme of many peers that send via mix or mixes cascade [9] . When the destination controls also some mixes, other active attacks are possible [30] .
In Theorem 7 we show that a Comp-SA-anonymous protocol exists; on the other hand, Theorem 10 shows that any deterministic Comp-SA-anonymous protocol against malicious destination that is also global eavesdropper, must have high overhead. Similar theorem for probabilistic protocols is stated and proved in [15] .
Ensuring Ultimate Anonymity Against Strong Attackers
Secure multi-party computation [17] allows n parties to compute a polynomially-computable n-ary functionality f (functionality with n inputs and n outputs), without any of them learning anything but the result of the computation, even if some minority of them are malicious. There has been many results in this area, where the most basic ones are of BGW [4, Theorem 3] with malicious minority of less than n 3
, and of GMW [18] with any malicious minority. Based on these results, in Theorem 7 we prove that there exists a polynomial time protocol that satisfies ultimate anonymity. The proof relies on the GMW's theorem [18] (informally in Theorem 6) although for the purpose of feasibility proof, other protocols would be useful as well.
Theorem 6. (GMW theorem [18] -informal):
Consider a synchronous network with pairwise semantically secure encrypted channels. Then:
For every polynomially-computable n-ary functionality f , there exists a polynomial time protocol Π f for computing f with computational security in the presence of a malicious adversary corrupting up to n 2 of the parties. Namely, during a run of Π f , a party might learn more than the case where a trusted third party (TTP) securely receives f 's inputs, computes f , and sends f 's outputs to the participants securely, only with negligible probability.
Theorem 7. There exists polynomial time protocol that satisfies liveness and ensures ultimate anonymity (Definition 5).
Proof. (sketch) We present a polynomially-computable n-ary functionality f that given a trusted third party (TTP), satisfies ultimate anonymity and liveness. From Theorem 6, this trusted third party can be replaced with a secure multiparty computation protocol Π f , if the malicious participants set S ⊂ [n], is a minority of the n participants (|S| < n 2 ). The functionality f sends up to some c ∈ poly(k) messages.
For simplicity, in this proof sketch, we consider a simple scheme of n participants, such that all the participants send anonymous messages only to one of them (the destination).
The n-functionality f is described in Algorithm 2. As an input to the secure computation, every peer chooses the lexicographically-first message in its application queue (or a dummy message if the application queue is empty), and as output the destination receives the lexicographically-lowest message, and the other peers receive empty output.
The functionality f has a state that saves all the real messages lexicographically-sorted; we refer this state as a priority queue by lexicographic order, P Q. Because the state must be of constant size (otherwise, the attacker can learn about the number of real messages that were sent), we choose |P Q| = c, and to prevent learning from overflows, we limit the number of messages delivered by the protocol to c. The functionality f is polynomially-computable in the security parameter k (the inputs length and |P Q| are ∈ poly(k), and f is a polynomial time algorithm).
From Theorem 6, it is enough to prove that a protocol I f , with a TTP that receives n inputs, satisfies both the requirements of the theorem, when some minority of the inputs is completely controlled by the attacker, and the other (the ones that represent the honest peers) are restricted by the relevant relations.
We next present such protocol I f . During a run of I f , the TTP iteratively securely receives f 's inputs from the n parties, computes f , and securely sends f 's outputs to the parties.
Lemmas 8 (I f is Comp-SA-anonymous) and 9 (I f is Comp-UO-anonymous) together show that I f ensures ultimate anonymity. The lemmas are stated and proven later in this section.
From Theorem 6, the trusted third party in I f can be replaced by a polynomial time secure multiparty computation of the n participants, such that the malicious participants set is S ⊂ [n], and |S| < n 2 . This protocol is denoted by Π f , and we assume that during its setup process, every two participants share unique key to construct private channels. Theorem 6 also says that it is impossible for a PPT A to Algorithm 2 The n-ary functionality f . State: A priority queue by lexicographic order P Q, and Counter for the incoming real messages. The initial state of P Q is an empty priority queue, and Counter starts from 0. Input: n messages (m1, m2, ..., mn). Output: We denote the destination as the i-th party; the output is (o1, o2, ..., oi, ..., on), such that oi is the first message in the priority queue P Q (or ⊥ message if P Q is empty), and for every j = i, oj =⊥.
1: for all message m in Sort(m1, m2, . .., mn) do 2:
if m is a real message and Counter < |P Q| then 3:
P Q.insert(m) 4:
end if 6: end for 7: if P Q is empty then 8: m = dummy 9: else 10: m = P Q.removeHead() 11: end if 12: Output = (⊥)
return Output learn about the inputs and the outputs of the honest peers from a run of Π f more than it learns from a run of I f (except with negligible probability).
Assume on the contrary that Adv
If A uses the same inputs for the honest parties during the experiment in both the scenarios, A cannot achieve any advantage. Hence, A succeeds to distinguish between two different scenarios with different inputs to the functionality. But from Lemma 8, there is no PPT A that can learn such information from a run of I f , except with negligible probability. Contradiction to Theorem 6, hence Π f ensures Comp-SA-anonymity against strong malicious destination.
Similarly, from Lemma 9, we get that Π f is also Comp-UO-anonymous against strong attacking peers.
To complete the proof, the liveness property of Π f is derived directly from the correctness of Theorem 6.
We now prove Lemmas 8 and 9 about the ideal protocol, I
f , described in the proof of Theorem 7.
Lemma 8. The I f protocol ensures Comp-SA-anonymity against strong malicious destination.
Proof. We prove that given any S ⊂ [n], |S| < n 2 , and a trusted third party that calculates the n-ary functionality f (see Alg. 2), and that the communication between the trusted party and the peers is secure, it holds that Adv Comp−SA I f ,n,A,(S,[n],1) (k) ≤ negl(k) (notice that we do not count the TTP as a participant).
Namely, given n peers, some minority of them is malicious and a TTP, no PPT attacker A that is a global eavesdropper malicious destination that controls the malicious peers, can distinguish between any two scenarios with identical unprotected data with non-negligible probability.
In the proof we assume that the destination of the messages is one of the malicious peers; otherwise, this is the case of strong attacking peers (Lemma 9).
Because I f uses trusted third party, the only information that the attacker receives is the outputs to the (only) malicious destination from the trusted party. We prove that for every two scenarios with the same unprotected data, i.e., two scenarios that are represented by two sequences of messages matrices {M
SA , the information that the attacker receives is identical in both the scenarios.
Every round of the protocol, the malicious destination receives one message (the other malicious peers always receive ⊥). We claim that in both scenarios, it receives exactly the same messages in the same order. Every honest peer sends the lexicographically-first message from its application level that has not sent yet, to the TTP. Malicious peers might sends whatever they want. Among all these messages, the TTP sends to the destination the lexicographically-first message. Therefore, every round the message with the lowest lexicographic value (from all the application messages that have not reached the destination until this round, and the messages of the malicious participants) is sent to the destination.
In both the scenarios, due to R H SA , every round the same messages are inserted into the application queue of the honest peers for the destination (the only possible difference is the distribution of the messages among the honest potential senders). The peer with the lexicographically-first message in each scenario will send it to the TTP, so the TTP always holds the application message with the lexicographically lowest value, that has not been sent yet to the destination. The TTP will send the destination either this message or a message from malicious peer (or a dummy).
Because the adversary receives identical information in both the scenarios, it cannot distinguish between them.
Lemma 9. The I f protocol ensures Comp-UO-anonymity against strong attacking peers.
Proof. Similarly to the Comp-SA-anonymity proof, and under the same notations, we need to prove that the advantage Adv
All the information the malicious peers receive is just ⊥ from the TTP (by f 's definition, Alg. 2), regardless of the chosen scenarios, and without any option to learn something about the inputs of the honest peers. Consequently, the attacker does not learn any information about the simulated scenario and has no advantage at all.
Remark about the protocols
The lexicographic order of the messages in the application queues and in P Q is necessary. Let I be identical protocol, but such that the messages are chosen uniformly out of the application queues, and the trusted third party's priority queue (by lexicographic order) is replaced with a multiset of messages, such that the message to send is chosen uniformly among the messages in the multiset.
We consider the following two (valid by the R H SA relation) scenarios: In the first scenario, only p1 sends four messages {m1, m1, m1, m2} to the destination, and in the second scenario p1 sends to the destination {m1, m1, m1}, and p2 sends the additional message m2. A malicious destination can distinguish between the scenarios by the distribution of the first message that arrives. In the first scenario, the probability of m2 to reach the destination first is 1 4 , while in the second scenario, the probability of the same event is 1 2 . Consequently, I is not Comp-SA-anonymous against malicious destination.
Malicious Destination and Inefficiency
The protocol we presented in the proof of Theorem 7 satisfies ultimate anonymity, but has very high communication overhead. We now prove that the cost of ensuring Comp-SA-anonymity against strong malicious destination must be low efficiency (high communication overhead).
Theorem 10 discusses the inefficiency of deterministic protocols that ensure Comp-SA-anonymity against strong malicious destination. Similar theorem about the inefficiency of probabilistic protocols, is stated and proven in [15] .
We define the number of 'send' events by a peer pi in the first R rounds of a run of a deterministic protocol π, according to scenario σ, by L π i (σ, R) (this is while the adversary does not deviate from the protocol).
Theorem 10. For every deterministic protocol, π, if π is Comp-SA-anonymous against global eavesdropper destination, then for every run of protocol π by scenario σ, and every R ∈ N, during the first R rounds of the run:
1. The number of messages that reach the destination is Out
2. The total number of 'send' events is
Proof. (sketch) Let π be some deterministic protocol that ensures Comp-SA-anonymity against malicious destination that is also global eavesdropper. If some participant pi of π, sends traffic according to the number of messages in its application queue, a global eavesdropper attacker can detect that, by choosing two different scenarios where pi has different amount of messages in its application queue.
Therefore, for every two scenarios restricted by R H SA , π's participants send regardless the messages in their application queue. Namely, for every pi, for every two scenarios σ0, σ1 (restricted by R Let σ0 be described by {M
. We define a scenario σ1 by a sequence of matrices {M
as follows:
k,l , i.e., pj sends all the messages that were sent by M Because π is deterministic, if b = 0 then from the choice of σ0 and R , C = Out
, as pj sends all the messages in the scenario σ1. Therefore the attacker has the maximal advantage (Definition 2), 1, and π is not Comp-SA-anonymous against malicious destination that is also global eavesdropper. In contradiction to the initial assumption.
This proves the first claim of the theorem. The second claim follows directly from the definition of L π i (σ, R) and from the first claim.
An important observation that follows from the above theorem, is that when peers send independently of each other (must happen in the case of malicious peers), because the maximal output is bounded, the number of the messages in the protocol level increases (and therefore also the used storage).
The above theorem is for protocols that partially satisfy the first requirement of ultimate anonymity. Additionally, the adversary in the proof is only passive global eavesdropper destination. For protocols that satisfy ultimate anonymity, the values of efficiency metrics like maximal throughput (Out), communication overhead (Com) and latency, are worse.
INDISTINGUISHABILITY BETWEEN PERMUTED SCENARIOS
The Comp-SA-anonymity definition against malicious destination (see Section 3) is very hard and expensive to achieve, and therefore also ultimate anonymity. The power of malicious destination attacker might seem extremely strong: the attacker chooses the messages to send, affects their timing, and in addition is able to receive these messages and learn information from their arrival times.
This motivates us to create relaxed definition to anonymity notions against malicious destination. Like the extension to the definition in Section 3, this extension is relevant only for two anonymity notions: N ∈ {SU L, SA}.
Permuted Scenarios
We now present a relaxed relation between the matrices of the messages sent in the two scenarios. We add a restriction on the two chosen scenarios: the only difference between them should be the identities of the senders.
We enforce this new restriction, by verifying that for every pair of messages matrices (chosen by the attacker), the rows of the first matrix are some constant permutation of the other.
The same permutation must be used during the whole experiment (we give the attacker to choose it), otherwise some of the problems of the extension in Section 3 arise again. We enforce this new restriction by defining a new relation R H,τ N (Definition 11). Matrix row notation. For a matrix M ∈ Mn×m(V *), we denote the ith row of M by Rowi(M ).
Definition 11. For a given n ∈ N, consider a pair of matrices, (
Comp-N-Anonymity Against Malicious Destination
We denoted the relaxed anonymity notions by N. Relaxed ultimate anonymity is ultimate anonymity (see Section 4), but with Comp-SA-anonymity instead of Comp-SA-anonymity.
We extend the definition to deal with malicious destination, almost as described in Section 3.1, i.e., the capability is extended, and in the experiment (Alg. 
Feasibility of the Permuted Comp-SAanonymity
Under the new extension, the DC-net protocol [10] in a ring topology, ensures also Comp-SA-anonymity even against global eavesdropper destination that also controls another malicious peer (see Appendix B.3). In more complex topologies, DC-net ensures anonymity even against higher number of malicious peers [35] [16] . In spite of that, DC-net does not ensure t-liveness.
In [15] , we present a protocol with communication overhead O(t 3 ) that ensures relaxed ultimate anonymity when the attacker controls t < √ n participants, and also satisfies t-liveness.
CONCLUSIONS AND DIRECTIONS
We presented modular definitions covering multiple anonymity notions, against a variety of attackers: eavesdroppers, malicious peers, malicious destination and combinations of them.
Known protocols [28] do not satisfy ultimate anonymity, i.e., sender anonymity against strong malicious destination and unobservability against strong attacking peers; this motivates our study of the feasibility of ultimate anonymity. We proved that there exists a protocol that satisfies ultimate anonymity. Because ultimate anonymity implies inefficiency, we offered relaxed definition to anonymity notions against the destination, that some known protocols like DC-net [10] satisfy.
The first challenge that comes following our work, is to explore the space between protocols that fail to satisfy the ultimate anonymity, and the extremely inefficient protocol (although polynomial) that satisfies it. Namely, to find more efficient protocols that satisfy ultimate anonymity, and better bounds for the efficiency metrics of them. The second challenge is to find the most efficient protocols that ensure relaxed ultimate anonymity, esp., together with robustness requirements.
Another interesting direction is to find bounds for the communication overhead of protocols that satisfy anonymity notions with regarding to the t-liveness property they satisfy. Finally, it would be interesting to explore the implications of relaxing the model, e.g., removing the synchronization assumptions. Hevia and Micciancio's anonymity notions are defined by the R N relations [21] . The R N relations enforce the unprotected data (the attacker assumed knowledge) in a pair of scenario matrices to be identical, with regarding to anonymity notion N. The different relations are defined by the functions f∪, fΣ and f # that map matrices from Mn×n(V *) into V *, N n and N respectively:
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B. DC-NET'S COMP-SA-ANONYMITY
AGAINST MALICIOUS DESTINATION
B.1 DC-Net
The dining-cryptographers network protocol [10] , is a multi party computation protocol. The protocol is based on David Chaum's solution to the dining cryptographers problem:
Three cryptographers gather around a table for dinner. The waiter informs them that the meal has been paid by someone, who could be one of the cryptographers or the National Security Agency (NSA). The cryptographers respect each other's right to make an anonymous payment, but want to find out whether the NSA paid.
In the solution, every cryptographer flips a coin (or a bit) and shows his result (1 or 0) only to the cryptographer on his left. Now every cryptographer publishes the XOR of his own bit with the bit of the cryptographer on his right side. published bits is 0 then NSA paid for the meal, otherwise, it is one of the cryptographers.
To send messages of length l, a random bits vector of length l should be used. The protocol can be extended to n peers in different topologies, the most common is the ring.
B.2 DC-Net is Not Comp-SA-Anonymous Against Malicious Destination
There is something that the DC-net protocol cannot hide: whether in a round two participants sent or only one. In the DC-net, it takes one round to send a message, and only one participant can send a message in a round (otherwise, there is a collision).
We now consider the following scheme: the three cryptographers p1, p2, p3 want to send anonymous messages to a fourth cryptographer p4 (n = 4). For that purpose, they run the DC-net protocol in rounds between them, and every one of them sends his output to the destination. The destination XORs the three cryptographers output and gets the message.
We present a malicious destination attacker that has nonnegligible advantage. The attacker works as follows:
1. In the first round, choose two matrices: in the first scenario p1 and p2 send m1 and m2 (such that m1 ⊕ m2 ∈ {m1, m2}) respectively, and in the second scenario p1 sends both the messages (these matrices are legal by R H SA ). 2. After the three cryptographers send their first outputs c1, c2, c3, calculate m = c1 ⊕ c2 ⊕ c3. If m ∈ {m1, m2} return 1. Otherwise return 0.
A is a polynomial time. Additionally: Adv Therefore, according to the definition of Section 3, DCnet is not Comp-SA-anonymous. We note that while the destination does not eavesdrop and does not control some of the peers, collision detection mechanism might be useful.
However, such mechanisms might hurt the unobservability of the protocol against malicious peers.
B.3 DC-Net is Comp-SA-Anonymous Against Malicious Destination
We now discuss a scheme of n > 4 participants (n − 1 potential senders and destination pn). We give a proof sketch that in a ring topology, while the channels are pairwise encrypted with secure encryption scheme [3] , DC-net is Comp-SA-anonymous by the malicious destination extension of Section 5, even against malicious destination and global eavesdropper attacker that controls additional peer. Namely, an attacker with capability Cap=({i, n}, [n], 1) for some i ∈ [n − 1].
We omit here the proof for the following claim: given the messages that were sent in a round, and given the final output of all the participants, it is impossible to learn something about the senders identity (unconditional anonymity). This claim holds even if one participant is malicious: i.e., tell the malicious destination what he sent and received [16, Appendix A] . In a ring topology (of more than three peers), for breaking the anonymity of some peer, there is a need in both the peers on its sides [35] .
Following the above claim, and if the attacker cannot break the encryption scheme, it is enough to prove that for every two scenarios with the same unprotected data, in every round the same messages are sent in both the scenarios.
Scenarios with the same unprotected data are defined by two matrices sequences {M SA relation, in every round, when pj sends m in the first scenario, then p τ (j) sends m in the second scenario, and therefore the messages that are sent are identical for every round in both the scenarios.
Hence, the attacker cannot break the anonymity without breaking the encryption scheme for learning additional information. Formal proof can be done by reducing the Comp-SA-anonymity to the security of the encryption scheme.
